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Abstract
In [10], we introduce a process calculus for describing security protocols and we propose a static and compo-
sitional analysis of entity authentication. In this paper we apply such a technique on well-known shared key
authentication protocols. The analysis helps clarifying the protocol logics, suggests simplifications and reveals
some attacks. Moreover we discuss how our analysis scales up to multi-protocol systems.
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1 Introduction
Security protocols are designed to provide diverse security guarantees in possibly
hostile environments: typical guarantees include the secrecy of a message exchange
between two trusted entities, the freshness and authenticity of a message, the au-
thenticity of a claimed identity, . . . and more.
The presence of hostile entities makes protocol design complex and often er-
ror prone, as shown by many attacks to long standing protocols reported in the
literature (e.g., [12,15,20,22,25,27]). In most cases, such attacks dwell on flaws
in the protocols’ logic, rather than on breaches in the underlying cryptosystem.
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Indeed, even when cryptography is assumed as a fully reliable building-block, an
intruder can engage a number of potentially dangerous actions, notably, intercept-
ing/replaying/forging messages, to break the intended protocol invariants.
Formal methods have proved very successful as tools for protocol design and
validations. On the one hand, failures to model-check protocols against formal
specifications has lead to the discovery of several attacks ( e.g., [22,23,24,26,27]).
On the other hand, static techniques, based on type systems and control-flow anal-
yses have proved effective in providing static guarantees on the protocols’ correct-
ness [1,3,2,6,16,17].
Overview Static analysis is also at the basis of the technique we propose in [10,9]:
we formulate a set of decidable conditions on the protocols’ executions that imply
formal guarantees of entity authentication for a large class of protocols. The analy-
sis is carried out in isolation on each participant: each validated principal is decreed
locally correct. Our main result, then, is that protocols consisting of the composi-
tion of locally correct principals are safe, i.e., any composition of compliant and
validated principals is immune to attacks mounted by any protocol intruder 4 . Our
technique in based on a new process calculus, named ρ-spi calculus , that we use
to specify the authentication protocols of interest: ρ-spi calculus is a dialect of the
spi calculus [4] and includes a set of authentication-specific constructs inspired by
the process calculus for protocol narrations Lysa [6].
In this paper, we apply the above mentioned technique to some well-known
protocols: Iso Symmetric Key Two Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol [21],
the nonce-based version of the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol [4], the Woo and Lam
Authentication Protocols [29] and the Amended Needham Schroeder Shared-Key
Protocol [28]. Our aim is to show that the analysis is applicable to a wide set of
authentication protocols. Based on our analysis, we prove the safety of correct
protocols for an unbounded number of sessions and, in some cases, we propose
simplifications. On the other side, our analysis fails in validating flawed protocols
suggesting possible attacks. Moreover, we show that our analysis helps clarifying
and formalizing the logics behind the protocols. We give also an example of a
multi-protocol system, where entities run multiple sessions of different protocols.
We analyze the interleavings among different sessions and discuss how our analysis
guarantees their safety.
Structure of the paper. §2 gives a brief outline of ρ-spi calculus and its operational
semantics. §3 summarizes our static analysis, and its main properties. § 4 presents
some case studies. In § 5 we give an example of multi-protocol system and in § 6
4 We implicitly appeal to the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model [14]. Intruders may intercept,
reply and forge new messages, but never decrypt messages without knowing the corresponding
keys.
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some concluding remarks.
2 The ρ-spi calculus
The ρ-spi calculus derives from the spi calculus [4], and inherits many of the fea-
tures of Lysa, a version of the spi calculus proposed in [6] for the analysis of authen-
tication protocols. The ρ-spi calculus differs from both calculi in several respects:
(i) it incorporates the notion of tagged message exchange from [9], (ii) it provides
primitives for declaring process identities and (shared) long-term keys, (iii) it pro-
vides new useful authentication-specific constructs.
Table 1 Syntax
Notation: d ranges over simple names and simple variables, I over identity labels, A,B over principal labels,
T over TTP labels, C over tags: {Claim,Owner,Verif ,Key, Id},
D ::= Data
n simple names
n : C tagged names
x simple variables
x : C tagged variables
P,Q ::= Processes
I S (principal)
I!S (replication)
P|Q (composition)
let k = key(I1, I2).P (key assignment)
S ::= Sequential processes
0 (nil)
in(D1, . . . ,Dm).S (input)
out(D1, . . . ,Dm).S (output)
new(n).S (restriction)
decrypt x as {D1, . . . ,Dm}d .S (decryption)
encrypt {D1, . . . ,Dm}d as x.S (encryption)
run(I1,I2).S (run)
commit(I1,I2).S (commit)
Syntax. The syntax of the calculus is presented in Table 1. We presuppose two
countable sets: N , of names and V of variables. We reserve a,b,k,m,n for names
and x,y,z for variables. Both names and variables can be tagged, noted n : C and
x : C, respectively. Tags are a special category of names and include roles (the
three special names Claim,Owner,Verif), the identity tag Id and the session key
tag Key (tags are explained in Section 3 and their use is illustrated in Section 4).
Identities ID are a subset of names, ID ⊂ N, further partitioned into principals IP
and trusted third parties (TTPs) IT .
Processes (or protocols), ranged over by P,Q are formed as parallel composi-
tion of, possibly replicated, sequential processes, ranged over by S. The process
form I  S represents the sequential process S running on behalf of a certain entity
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identified by I. A sequential process may never fork into two parallel processes.
This assumption helps assigning unique identities in ID to (sequential) processes
and it is justified by observing that principals, such as initiators, responders and
TTPs, can be specified as sequential processes, possibly sharing some long-term
keys. To allow the sharing of long-term keys among sequential processes, we pro-
vide ρ-spi calculus with let-bindings as in let k = key(I1, I2).P to declare (and bind)
the long-term key k shared between I1 and I2 in the scope P.
The reading of the process forms is as follows. Process 0 is the null process that
does nothing, as usual. Process new(n).S generates a fresh name n local to S. The
constructs for input, output, new and decryption are essentially the same as in the
calculus Lysa. In particular, as in Lysa, we presuppose a unique (anonymous) pub-
lic channel from/to which messages are read/sent, a technique that models well the
worst-case situation of an intruder with a complete control of the network. Sim-
ilarly to Lysa, our input and decryption constructs may test part of the message
read (decrypted), by pattern-matching. Specifically, process in(D1, . . . ,Dm).S reads
a message composed of m parts matching the respective Di and continues as S,
where all the variables instantiated by the pattern-matching are replaced by their
actual values. Process out(D1, . . . ,Dm).S outputs a messages composed of m parts
and then continues as S. The pattern-matching mechanism is so defined as to en-
sure that untagged patterns only match untagged messages, while tagged patterns
only match tagged messages (provided that the tags also match). Accordingly, the
pattern x matches the message n (and binds x to n) but it does not match n : Claim
(as x is untagged, while n : C is tagged). Similarly, x : Claim matches n : Claim but
does not match n : Verif.
Pattern matching also applies upon decryption. Process decrypt x as {D1, . . .,
Dm}d .S continues only if x contains a message encrypted with key d and composed
of m parts that match the respective Di. As for input, all the variables instantiated
by the pattern-matching are replaced in the continuation S.
Unlike the spi calculus and Lysa, in ρ-spi calculus we introduce an explicit
construct for encryption: process encrypt {D1, . . . ,Dm}d as x.S binds variable x to
the encrypted message {D1, . . . ,Dm}d in the continuation S. This is useful for our
analysis, as it eases the reasoning based on the structural inspection of the encrypted
messages of a protocol. Finally, the process forms run(I1,I2).S and commit(I1,I2)
declare that the sequential process I1 is starting, respectively committing, a protocol
session with I2. These constructs are used to check the correspondence assertions
as done in [16].
Example 1: We illustrate the ρ-spi calculus with the following simple (flawed)
authentication protocol:
1) B → A : nB
2) A → B : {nB,m}kAB
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We assume kAB to be known only by A and B and nB to be a fresh nonce generated
by B. The intention of the protocol is to give guarantee to B that the last message
has been (recently) generated by A as only A should be able to encrypt the freshly
generated nonce nB. This protocol can be simply formalized in our calculus as
shown in Table 2. Process Initiator, generates a fresh message m ∈ N . After
receiving x, it signals the start of a new authentication run with B, encrypts x and m
with the long term key kAB, and then sends out the encrypted message. Similarly,
Responder generates a fresh nonce nB and sends it out. Then, it reads y from the
net and decrypts it with the long term key kAB, checking the nonce nB (through
the pattern-matching mechanism of decryption). If the match is successful, the
variable z gets bound to a message (from A) and the principal commits through
commit(B,A).
Notice that we are only modeling one protocol session. However, as we will
see, multiple sessions can be easily achieved by just replicating the Initiator and
Responder processes.
Table 2 An example of protocol narration in ρ-spi calculus
Protocol  let kAB = key(A,B)(A Initiator(A,B) | B Responder(B,A))
Initiator(A,B)  new(m).in(x).run(A,B).encrypt{x,m}kAB as y.out(y)
Responder(B,A)  new(nB).out(nB).in(y).decrypt y as {nB,z}kAB .commit(B,A)
Operational Semantics. The operational semantics of ρ-spi calculus is given in
terms of traces, after [7]. The category M of Messages is defined by the following
productions: M ::= x | n | {M1, . . . ,Mm}M | M : C, and includes variables, names,
and ciphertexts, possibly tagged. A trace is either empty, noted ε, or formed as
s :: α where s a trace and α and action. Every prefix form generates a corre-
sponding action. The set of all possible actions, noted Act, includes the action
key(k, I1, I2) generated by key assignment, I  in(M1, . . . ,Mm) generated by input,
I  out(M1, . . . ,Mm) by output, I  new(n) by restriction, I  {M1, . . . ,Mm}M by
encryption and I  {M1, . . . ,Mm}M by decryption, run(A,B) and commit(A,B) by
‘run’ and ‘commit’.
In ρ-spi calculus , communication is always performed from/to the environ-
ment (processes never synchronize directly). The intruder is modeled implicitly
in the environment, by encoding it with rules that formalize the possible ways to
manipulate intercepted messages. We denote with T (P) the set of traces of P. The
transition semantics is defined formally in [10].
Example 2: Consider again process Protocol of the previous example. The fol-
lowing, is a possible trace of that process:
key(kAB,A,B) :: A new(m) :: B new(nB) :: B out(nB) :: A in(nB) :: run(A,B) :: A
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encrypt{nB,m}kAB :: Aout({nB,m}kAB) :: B in({nB,m}kAB) :: Bdecrypt{nB,m}kAB :: commit(B,A)
Notice that this trace represents only one of the possible interleavings of Ini-
tiator and Responder actions. In this particular trace, commit(B,A) is preceded by
run(A,B). According to the Woo and Lam idea of correspondence assertions [30],
this trace is safe, since B is convinced to communicate with A (action commit(B,A) )
and A is indeed running the protocol with B (action run(A,B) ).
This protocol is not correct when multiple sessions (with A and B running both
as Initiator and as Responder) are considered, as it suffers of a reflection attack.
As mentioned above, multiple sessions can be modeled by replicating processes
Initiator and Responder. For example, to model multiple protocol sessions, we
may consider the following process:
Protocol2  let kAB = key(A,B). (A !Initiator(A,B) |A  !Responder(A,B))|
B !Responder(B,A) |B  !Initiator(B,A))
Notice that A and B run both as Initiator and as Responder. Indeed, the new pro-
cesses Initiator(B,A) and Responder(A,B) model B running as Initiator and A run-
ning as Responder, respectively. Consider the following trace for Protocol2:
key(kAB,A,B) :: Bnew(m) :: Bnew(nB) :: Bout(nB) :: B in(nB) :: run(B,A) :: Bencrypt{nB,m}kAB ::
Bout({nB,m}kAB) :: B in({nB,m}kAB) :: B decrypts {nB,m}kAB :: commit(B,A)
It is the same as above, except that B is running as initiator instead of A (as pointed
out in bold font). Indeed B, is running the protocol with himself while A is do-
ing nothing. Notice that the attack is revealed by the absence of correspondence:
commit(B,A) is not matched by any run(A,B). The trace corresponds to the follow-
ing (well-known) reflection attack:
1.a) B → E(A) : nB
1.b) E(A) → B : nB
2.a) B → E(A) : {m,nB}kAB
2.b) E(A) → B : {m,nB}kAB
We conclude this section by formalizing the definition of safety based on corre-
spondence assertions. As in [16], we say that a trace is safe if every commit(B,A)
is preceded by a distinct run(A,B). A protocol guarantees entity authentication if
all of its traces are safe.
Definition 2.1 [Safety] A trace s is safe if and only if whenever s= s1 :: commit(B,A)
:: s2, then s1 = s′1 :: run(A,B) :: s′′1, and s′1 :: s′′1 :: s2 is safe. A process P is safe if,
∀s ∈ T (P),s is safe.
Notice that the trace corresponding to the attack discussed in Example 2 is not
safe since commit(B,A) is not matched by run(A,B).
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3 A Compositional Proof Technique
Our analysis exploits a tagging mechanism for messages that makes the interpreta-
tion of certain, critical message components unambiguous. The untagged part of a
message forms the message’s payload, while the tagged components include entity
identifiers, tagged with Id, session keys, tagged with Key, and nonces. Nonce tags
are more elaborate, as they convey information on the role that nonces play in the
authentication protocol: specifically, nonces may be tagged with Claim, in mes-
sages that authenticate a claimant, with Verif , in messages that specify an intended
verifier, or with Owner in messages that authenticate a session key.
The proof technique applies to protocol narrations that may be represented as
ρ-spi processes of the form
keys(k1, . . . ,kn).(I1  !S1 | . . . | Im  !Sm)
where keys(k1, . . . ,kn) represents a sequence of let binding for the long-term keys
k1, . . . ,kn. The analysis proceeds by examining each process keys(k1, . . . ,kn).Ii  Si,
and attempts to validate Si under the key assignment determined by the prefix
keys(k1, . . . ,kn).
Given a process keys(k1, . . . ,kn).I  S, we make the following assumptions on
the way that long-term and session keys are circulated among principals and trusted
third parties, namely: (a) long-term keys are never circulated in clear or within
encrypted packets; (b) only principals may receive session keys, without leaking
them; and (c) fresh session keys are only distributed by TTP’s at most to two par-
ties, only once. When these assumptions are satisfied, we say that keys(k1, . . . ,kn).
I S is {k1, . . . ,kn}-safe. This is fully formalized in [10].
The proof rules (tables 3 and 4) validate each principal and trusted party of
the protocol, relative to a given identity, and two environments, i.e., they derive
judgments of the form I;Γ;Π S for the sequential process S relative to the identity
I and the two environments Γ and Π. The history environment Π keeps track of
each encryption, decryption, run and key assignment occurring in the sequence
of actions performed by the party in question. The nonce environment Γ holds the
nonces that the party generates 5 . A nonce is first included in Γ as unchecked, when
it is introduced by a new prefix. Subsequently, the nonce may be checked by pattern
matching, and marked as such, in rules (Authenticate Claim), (Authenticate
Owner) and (Authenticate Verif) (in Table 3). The proof rules are so defined as
to ensure that each nonce may be checked at most once, as desired. We will explain
the intuition behind rules when applying them in our case studies.
5 We write Π(x) = enc{. . .}d to say that x → enc{. . .}d ∈Π, and similarly for the other entries. We
write Π(•) = enc{. . .}d to mean that there exists x such that Π(x) = enc{. . .}d .
R. Focardi, M. Maffei / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 99 (2004) 267–293 273
The local correctness, for a sequential process, can be established provided that
the process complies with the key safety assumption stated above.
Definition 3.1 [Local Correctness] Let P be the process keys(k1, . . . ,kn).I  S, with
ki shared between Ii and Ji. P is locally correct if the judgment I;∅;Πk1,...,kn  S is
Table 3 Local correctness: Principal and TTP rules
Claimant and Verifier Rules
Authenticate Claim
A;Γ,n : checked;Π  S Π(•) = dec{B : Id,n : Claim . . .}k Π(k) ∈ {key(A,T ),key(A,B)}
A;Γ,n : unchecked;Π  commit(A,B).S
Authenticate Owner
A;Γ,n : checked;Π  S Π(•) = dec{B : Id,n : Owner,y : Key . . .}kAT Π(kAT ) = key(A,T )
Π(•) = dec{D1 , . . . ,Dm}y (Π(•) = enc{D′1, . . . ,D′m}y′ implies ∃i s.t. D′i does not match Di)
A;Γ,n : unchecked;Π  commit(A,B).S
Authenticate Verif
A;Γ,n : checked;Π  S Π(•) = dec{A : Id,n : Verif . . .}kAB Π(kAB) = key(A,B)
A;Γ,n : unchecked;Π  commit(A,B).S
Claimant
A;Γ;Π.y → enc{A : Id,x : Claim}k  S Π(kAB) = key(A,B) Π=Π′.B → run
A;Γ;Π  encrypt{A : Id,x : Claim . . .}kAB as y.S
Owner
A;Γ;Π.y → enc{D1, . . . ,Dm}x  S
Π(•) = dec{B : Id,n : Owner,x : Key . . .}kAT Π(kAT ) = key(A,T ) Π=Π
′
.B → run
A;Γ;Π  encrypt{D1, . . . ,Dm}x as y.S
Verifier
A;Γ;Π.y → enc{B : Id,x : Verif}k  S Π(k) ∈ {key(A,T ),key(A,B)} Π= Π′.B → run
A;Γ;Π  encrypt{B : Id,x : Verif . . .}k as y.S
Run
A;Γ;Π.B → run  S
A;Γ;Π  run(A,B).S
TTP Rules
Ttp Forward & Check
T ;Γ,n : checked;Π.y → enc{A : Id,x : Claim}kBT  S
Π(•) = dec{B : Id,n : Verif . . .}kAT Π(kBT ) = key(B,T ) Π(kAT ) = key(A,T )
T ;Γ,n : unchecked;Π  encrypt {A : Id,x : Claim . . .}kBT as y.S
Ttp Forward
T ;Γ;Π.y → enc{A : Id,x : Claim}kBT  S
Π(•) = dec{B : Id,x : Verif . . .}kAT Π(kBT ) = key(B,T ) Π(kAT ) = key(A,T )
T ;Γ;Π  encrypt {A : Id,x : Claim . . .}kBT as y.S
Ttp Distribute
T ;Γ;Π.y → enc{A : Id,x : Owner,ks : Key}kBT  S
T ;Γ;Π  encrypt {A : Id,x : Owner,ks : Key . . .}kBT as y.S
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Table 4 Local Correctness: Generic Principal Rules
Generic Principal Rules
Nil
I;Γ;Π  0
New
I;Γ,n : unchecked;Π  S n fresh in Γ
I;Γ;Π  new(n).S
Input
I;Γ;Π  S
I;Γ;Π  in(. . .).S
Output
I;Γ;Π  S
I;Γ;Π  out(. . .).S
Encryption
I;Γ;Π.y → enc{d1 , . . . ,dm}d  S Π(•) = dec{. . . ,d : Key, . . .}k implies Π=Π′.B → run.x → enc{. . .}d .Π′′
I;Γ;Π  encrypt{d1, . . . ,dm}d as y.S
Decryption
I;Γ;Π.y → dec{D1 , . . . ,Dm}d  S
I;Γ;Π  decrypt y as {D1, . . . ,Dm}d .S
derivable, for Πk1,...,kn = k1 → key(I1,J1), . . . ,kn → key(In,Jn), and S is {k1, . . . ,kn}-
safe.
Finally, a process is correct if all of its sequential components are locally correct.
Definition 3.2 [Process Correctness] Let P = keys(k1, . . . ,kn).(I1  !S1 | · · · | Im 
!Sm). P is correct if the process keys(k1, . . . ,kn).Ii  Si is locally correct, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Our main result states that correctness, in the sense of Definition 3.2, is a sufficient
condition for safety (Definition 2.1) and, consequently, is a sufficient condition to
guarantee entity authentication. Formally:
Theorem 3.3 (Global Safety) Let P = keys(k1, . . . ,kn).(I1  !S1 | · · · | Im  !Sm).
If P is correct, then it is safe [10].
4 Case Studies
In this section we analyze some well-known authentication protocols. We give the
ρ-spi calculus code of the protocol and either we prove its safety or, in the case the
protocol is flawed, we show how it can be fixed in order to be proved correct. In 4.1,
we analyze the ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol
[21], in 4.2 the nonce-based version of the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol [4], in 4.3
the Woo and Lam Authentication Protocols [29] and in 4.4 the Amended Needham
Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol [28].?? the Carlsen’s Secret Key Initiator Protocol
[11].
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4.1 ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol
In this section, we apply our analysis to the ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Unilat-
eral Authentication Protocol [21]. The aim of this direct authentication protocol is
to authenticate A with B.
(1) B → A : nB
(2) A → B : {B,nB,m}kAB
In the first message, B sends to A a challenge. A receives the nonce and encrypts it
together with the identity label of B. B receives the ciphertext, checks the freshness
of the message by checking the equality between the nonce sent just before and
the nonce inside the ciphertext, and, in the case the operation is successful, accepts
the authentication request from A. The identity label B inside the ciphertext avoids
reflection attacks (see Section 2). The first step for analyzing this protocol by our
technique, is to suitably tag it: nB is used for checking the freshness of a message
where the identity label B specifies the intended verifier. Thus B is tagged as Id and
nB by Verif. Notice that tags makes clearer the role of message components.
(1) B → A : nB
(2) A → B : {B : Id,nB : Verif,m}kAB
The code of the protocol is in Table 5. The rule names, on the right side of every
construct, summarize the steps of the analysis.
Table 5 ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol
Protocoliso  let kAB = key(A,B).(A  Initiatoriso(kAB,A,B) |B Responderiso(kAB,B,A))
Initiatoriso(kAB,A,B)
new(m). NEW
in(x). INPUT
run(A,B). RUN
encrypt{B : Id,x : Verif,m}kAB as y. Verifier
out(y) OUTPUT
Responderiso(kAB,B,A)
new(nB). NEW
out(nB). OUTPUT
in(y). INPUT
decrypt y as {B : Id,nB : Verif,z}kAB . DECRYPTION
commit(B,A) Authenticate Verif
The local correctness of let kAB = key(A,B).A  Initiatoriso(kAB,A,B) can be proved
as in Table 6.
The hypotheses of rules (New), (Input), (Run) and (Output) are trivially verified;
the only interesting case is (Verifier), which is applied for proving
A;{m : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B).B → run  encrypt{B : Id,x : Verif,m}kAB as y.out(y)
Rules (Claimant), (Verifier) and (Owner) formalize the ways in which A may de-
clare her willingness to authenticate with B. This is why they require that run(A,B)
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Table 6 Initiatoriso(kAB,A,B): proof of safety
A;	;kAB → key(A,B)  new(m).in(x).run(A,B).encrypt{B : Id,x : Verif ,m}kAB as y.out(y)
↓ (NEW)
A;{m : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B)  in(x).run(A,B).encrypt{B : Id,x : Verif,m}kAB as y.out(y)
↓ (INPUT)
A;{m : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B)  run(A,B).encrypt{B : Id,x : Verif,m}kAB as y.out(y)
↓ (RUN)
A;{m : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B).B → run  encrypt{B : Id,x : Verif,m}kAB as y.out(y)
↓ (Verifier)
A;{m : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B).B → run.
y → enc{B : Id,x : Verif,m}kAB  out(y)
↓ (OUTPUT)
A;{m : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B).B → run.
y → enc{B : Id,x : Verif,m}kAB  0
(NIL)
Table 7 Responderiso(kAB,B,A): proof of safety
B;	;kAB → key(A,B)  new(nB).in(y).decrypt y as {B : Id,nB : Verif,z}kAB .commit(B,A)
↓ (NEW)
B;{nB : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B)  in(y).decrypt y as {B : Id,nB : Verif,z}kAB .commit(B,A)
↓ (INPUT)
B;{nB : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B)  decrypt y as {B : Id,nB : Verif,z}kAB .commit(B,A)
↓ (DECRYPTION)
B;{nB : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B).
y → dec{B : Id,nB : Verif,z}kAB  commit(B,A)
↓ (Authenticate Verif)
B;{nB : checked};kAB → key(A,B).
y → dec{B : Id,nB : Verif,z}kAB  0
(NIL)
has been previously executed. In particular, in (Verifier), A may request B to au-
thenticate herself, by sending a message {B : Id,x : Verif . . .}kAB to B using a long-
term key kAB shared with B. The role Verif is used, as expected, to inform B that he
is the intended verifier of the current authentication session. Rule (Verifier) can
be also used by A to inform a TTP T that B is the intended verifier. In that case the
ciphertext is encrypted with a long-term key shared between A and T (see Sections
4.2 and 4.3).
(Verifier) requires that B → run is the last element in the history environment
and that kAB → key(A,B) belongs to the history environment, which are both true.
As far as let kAB = key(A,B). Responderiso(kAB,B,A) is concerned, local correct-
ness can be proved as in Table 7.
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Proving the local correctness of let kAB = key(A,B).B  Responderiso(kAB,B,A)
is straightforward. The only interesting case is (Authenticate Verif), which is
applied for proving
B;{nB : unchecked};kAB → key(A,B).y → dec{B : Id,nB : Verif,z}kAB  commit(B,A)
Rules (Authenticate Claim), (Authenticate Owner) and (Authenticate Verif)
formalize the three possible ways for a principal A to authenticate another principal
B. Specifically, (Authenticate Verif) states that A may legally commit (hence au-
thenticate) B only if A has previously generated a nonce n and decrypted a message
{A : Id,n : Verif . . .}kAB (with the same nonce) with k shared with B.
(Authenticate Verif) hypotheses hold since y → dec{B : Id,nB : Verif,z}kAB
belongs to the history environment and nb:unchecked to the nonce environment.
Notice that this rule checks the nonce: this is why the binding of nB moves to
checked. Moreover, as required by (Authenticate Verif), the history environment
contains also kAB → key(A,B). Since (New), (Output), (Input) and (Decryption)
are trivially satisfied, B;	;kAB → key(A,B)  Responderiso (kAB,B,A).
Finally, the protocol uses no session keys and long term keys are neither sent
on the net nor encrypted. Thus both the initiator and responder code are key safe
and, hence, can be judged correct. By Theorem 3.3, we directly obtain that every
trace of Protocoliso is safe, thus no authentication attack is possible. This example
clarifies how direct authentication protocols are analyzed by our proof system: the
idea is that a commit(B,A) can be proved only if a ciphertext of a particular form has
been previously decrypted. That ciphertext must have been encrypted by following
one of the principles, in this case (Verifier). This guarantees that a run(A,B) has
been previously asserted. Since nonces can be checked only once, in every trace
generated by the protocol, every commit(B,A) is preceded by a distinct run(A,B).
Notice that Protocoliso models only one protocol session, thus one may ar-
gue that attacks could arise on multiple sessions. However this is not true as our
technique is fully compositional and guarantees that Protocoliso is safe even when
sequential processes Initiatoriso and Responderiso are arbitrarily replicated.
The specification can be generalized to an arbitrary number m of entities, acting
both as initiator and responder, arbitrarily replicated.
Protocoliso −m  letmi, j=1,i< jki j = key(Ii, I j).
(|mi, j=1,i= j Ii  !Initiatoriso(ki j, Ii, I j)|Ii  !Responderiso(ki j, Ii, I j)))
ki j represents a long term key shared between entities Ii and I j. We assume that
ki j = k ji (and correspondingly define the key assignment only for keys ki j with
i < j). Initiatoriso and Responderiso are arbitrarily replicated for every pair of
entities Ii, I j, using the appropriate long-term key. The proofs of correctness of
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processes letmi, j=1,i< jki j = key(Ii, I j).Ii  Initiatoriso(Ki j, Ii, I j) and letmi, j=1,i< jki j =
key(Ii, I j).Ii  Responderiso(Ki j, Ii, I j) are the same as those for the process let kAB
= key(kAB,A,B). A  Initiatoriso(kAB,A,B) and for let kAB = key (kAB,A,B). B 
Responderiso(kAB,B,A), up to a renaming of identities and keys. As specified by
Definition 3.2, replicated identical processes do not need to be re-proved correct.
A variant of the ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol
A slight variant of the Iso Symmetric Key Unilateral Authentication Protocol is the
following:
(1) B → A : nB
(2) A → B : {A,nB,m}KAB
The only difference is the identity label in (2): A instead of B, namely the claimant
label instead of the intended verifier one. The tagged version of the protocol is:
(1) B → A : nb
(2) A → B : {A : Id,nB : Claim,m}KAB
The protocol can be analyzed similarly to the protocol of Table 5. The only dif-
ference is that the encryptions with a nonce tagged by Claim are checked by rule
(Claimant) instead of rule (Verifier). Moreover the commit generated by the
decryption of such ciphertexts are proved by (Authenticate Claim) instead of
(Authenticate Verif). (Authenticate Claim) states that A may legally commit
(hence authenticate) B only if A has previously generated a nonce n and decrypted
a message {B : Id,n : Claim . . .}k (with the same nonce) with k shared either with B,
in the case of direct authentication protocols, or with a TTP T , if a TTP is used for
achieving authentication (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).
A flawed protocol
Let us consider again the protocol in Table 2. As discussed in Example 2, the
protocol is subject to attacks when running in multiple sessions. Indeed, the flaw
in the protocol’s logics is revealed by failure to validate one of its components.
The problem is with the responder, as we illustrate showing that the process let
kAB=key(kAB,A,B).B  Responder(B,A) is not locally correct. Notice that in order
for I;Γ;Π  commit(B,A) to be derivable, one needs I = B. However, we easily
see that Π such that B;Γ;Π  commit(B,A). In fact, for B;Γ;Π  commit(B,A) to
be derivable, by rules (Authenticate Claim), (Authenticate Owner), (Authenti-
cate Verif), it has to exists y such that Π(y) = dec{A : Id,nb : R . . .}kAB , with R ∈
{Claim,Owner,Verif}, but the only decrypt construct in S is decrypt y as {nB,z}kAB.
Thus, B;Γ;Π  commit(B,A).
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Notice that local correctness does not fail only because a role is not specified.
Indeed, even adding a role R ∈ {Claim,Owner} to the nonce, the hypotheses of the
two authentication rules would not hold, since the ciphertext is missing the identity
label A. The attack presented in Section 2 exploits precisely this flaw.
4.2 The nonce-based version of the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol
In this section, we apply our technique for proving the correctness of the nonce-
based version of the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol (WMF) [4], as presented in [16].
The protocol is composed of the following six messages:
Table 8 Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol in ρ-spi calculus
ProtocolW MF 
let ki = keymi=1(Ii,I0).
(|m
i, j = 1
i = j
Ii!InitiatorW MF (ki,Ii,Ij)|
Ii!ResponderW MF (ki,Ij ,Ii)|
I0!ServerW MF (ki,Ii,k j ,Ij))
ServerW MF (ki,Ii,k j ,Ij)
new(nT ) NEW
in(Ii). INPUT
out(nT ). OUTPUT
in(Ii,xi). INPUT
decrypt xi as {Ij : Id,xi j ,nT : Verif}ki . DECRYPTION
in(xB). INPUT
encrypt{Ii : Id,xi j ,xB : Claim}k j as x. Ttp Forw. & Check
out(x) OUTPUT
InitiatorW MF (ki,Ii,Ij)
new(ki j) NEW
out(Ii). OUTPUT
in(xT ). INPUT
run(Ii,Ij). RUN
encrypt{Ij : Id,ki j ,xT : Verif}ki as x. Verif
out(Ii,x) OUTPUT
ResponderW MF (k j ,Ij ,Ii)
new(nB) NEW
out(nB). OUTPUT
in(x). INPUT
decrypt x as {Ii : Id,xab,nB : Claim}k j DECRYPTION
commit(Ij ,Ii) Auth Claim
(1) A → T : A
(2) T → A : nT
(3) A → T : A,{B,kAB,nT}kAT
(4) T → B : ∗
(5) B → T : nB
(6) T → B : {A,kAB,nB}kBT
The aim of the protocol is to establish a session key kAB between A and B, using a
TTP T . Long-term keys kAT and kBT are shared between A and T and between B
and T , respectively. The protocol works as follows: in the first message A sends
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to T her own identity label and, in the second message, T replies to A by sending
a fresh nonce nT . In the third message, A generates a fresh session key kAB and
sends the encrypted message {B,kAB,nT}kAT to T , meaning that she is asking T to
transport the session-key kAB to B. By checking nT , T is ensured about the freshness
of the received ciphertext. Identity label A (sent as plaintext) is a hint for choosing
the correct decryption key. The (void) fourth message is just a request from T of
starting the protocol with B. In the fifth message B sends to T a fresh nonce nB and,
in the last message, T sends to B a ciphertext containing the identity label A, the
key kAB and the nonce nB, used again for ensuring freshness. With the last message,
T communicates to B that A is willing to share the key kAB with him.
We give a specification of the WMF protocol in ρ-spi calculus in Table 8 .
ProtocolWMF is divided into two parts: in the former, m long term keys ki are
associated to the principal Ii and to the TTP T through the construct let ki=key(Ii, I0)
iterated for all i = 1, . . . ,m. We assume I0 ∈ IT and Ii ∈ IP for all i = 1, . . . ,m. The
latter part consists of the parallel composition of principals and trusted servers.
Every principal is parameterized by a specific session partner. Also, every trusted
server is parameterized by a specific pair composed of a claimant and a verifier
(with the respective keys).
The rule names, on the right side of every construct, show how to verify the local
correctness of every sequential component. We briefly discuss the most interesting
cases:
InitiatorWMF(ki, Ii, I j) The only interesting case is (Verifier) which is applied for
proving Ii;Γi;Πi  encrypt{I j : Id,ki j,xT : Verif}ki as x.out(Ii,x). All the hy-
potheses are satisfied since Πi =Π′i.I j → run and Πi(ki) = key(Ii, I0).
ResponderWMF(k j, I j, Ii) The only interesting case is (Authenticate Claim) which
is applied for proving I j;Γ j;Π j  commit(I j, Ii). All the hypotheses hold since
Π j(x)= dec{Ii : Id,xab,nB :Claim}k j andΠ j(k j)= key(I j, I0). MoreoverΓ j(nB)=
unchecked, since nB has not been checked before..
ServerWMF(ki, Ii,k j, I j) The only interesting case is (Ttp Forward & Check) which
is applied for proving I0;Γ0;Π0  encrypt{Ii : Id,xi j,xB : Claim}k j as x. out(x).
Rules (Ttp Forward & Check), (Ttp Forward) and (Ttp Distribute) gov-
ern the behavior of TTPs. The first two rules regulate the generation of mes-
sages of the form {. . . ,A : Id, . . . ,x : Claim, . . .}k, the third the generation of ses-
sion keys. Specifically, in rule (Ttp Forward & Check), T generates a mes-
sage {. . . ,A : Id, . . . ,x : Claim, . . .}kBT if it has previously decrypted (and checked
the nonce n of) a message of the form {. . . ,B : Id, . . . ,n : Verif, . . .}kAT , and
kAT and kBT are shared with A and B respectively. All the hypotheses hold
since Π0(xi) = dec{I j : Id,xi j,nT : Verif}ki and Γ0(nT ) = unchecked. Moreover
Π0(ki) = key(Ii, I0) and Π0(k j) = key(I j, I0).
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Key Safety is trivially satisfied, as long term keys are never extruded and no session
key is tagged by Key: this means no session key is used for authentication. Thus,
ProtocolWMF is correct.
Type Flaws and Tagging
Actually the protocol discussed above is affected by the following type flaw attack:
(1.b) A → E(T ) : A
(4.a) E(T ) → A : ∗
(5.a) A → E(T ) : nA
(2.b) E(T ) → A : nA
(3.b) A → E(T ) : A,{B,kAB,nA}KAT
(6.a) E(T ) → A : {B,kAB,nA}KBT
The sessions a and b are interleaved. The enemy waits for an authentication request
from A, (1.b). Then the enemy impersonates T and starts a new session with A,
(4.a), who generates a new nonce nA, (5.a). The enemy, by impersonating the
TTP T , sends back to A the nonce nA, (2.b). A generates the ciphertext where the
verifier of the authentication session is specified, (3.b). The enemy intercepts the
ciphertext. Notice that the form of the ciphertext in (3) is the same as the ciphertext
in (6). Thus the enemy can reply to A the ciphertext generated by A herself, (6.a).
A believes that the identity label B represents the claimant of the authentication
session and accepts the (false) authentication request from B.
Notice that the attack is possible only on the untagged version of the protocol:
when messages are tagged, the ciphertext sent in (3.b) differs from the one that
B expects to receive in (6.b) because of the different tag. This shows how tag-
ging solves message ambiguities. Indeed, we assume that protocol messages are
effectively tagged when implemented. Notice that the same protocol, with tagged
ciphertexts, is type-checked and considered safe also in [16]. The tagging used
there adds a different label to each encrypted protocol message, so that ciphertexts
cannot be confused. That tagging is very reasonable and can be easily incorpo-
rated in protocol implementations. Our tagging is strictly less demanding: we do
not require that every message is unambiguously tagged since we tag only certain
components: two ciphertexts of two different protocol messages could be confused
if they have the same tags. As a consequence, if the protocol is implemented with
the reasonable tagging technique used in [16], our tags can be safely removed with-
out compromising the protocol safety.
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4.3 The Woo and Lam Authentication Protocols
The following protocols are proposed by Woo and Lam in [29]. They start by
protocol Π f and, step by step, simplify it to Π. The final simplification results in a
flawed protocol.
Protocol Π f :
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {A,B,nB}kAT
(4) B → T : {A,B,nB,{A,B,nB}kAT }kBT
(5) T → B : {A,B,nB}kBT
The aim of this protocol is to authenticate A with B. A starts the protocol by sending
her own identity label to B, (1). B responds with a challenge nonce nB, (2). That
nonce is encrypted by A, with the long term key shared with the TTP T , together
with her own identity label and the identity label of B, (3). A represents the claimant
of the authentication session, while B the intended verifier. B receives the ciphertext
and encrypts it, with the long term key shared with T , together with the two identity
labels A and B and the nonce nB. By that ciphertext, B asks T for confirming the
authentication request from A. T receives the ciphertext, and encrypts the two
identity labels and the nonce nB with the long term key shared with B, (5). B
receives the ciphertext, checks its freshness and accepts the authentication request
of A.
Protocol Π1, obtained from Π f by removing the first occurrence of nB from (4):
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {A,B,nB}kAT
(4) B → T : {A,B,{A,B,nB}kAT }kBT
(5) T → B : {A,B,nB}kBT
Protocol Π2, obtained from Π1 by removing every occurrence of B:
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {A,nB}kAT
(4) B → T : {A,{A,nB}kAT }kBT
(5) T → B : {A,nB}kBT
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Protocol Π3, obtained from Π2 by removing the identity label A from (3) and the
second occurrence of A from (4):
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {nB}kAT
(4) B → T : {A,{nB}kAT }kBT
(5) T → B : {A,nB}kBT
Protocol Π, obtained from Π3 by removing the identity label A from (5):
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {nB}kAT
(4) B → T : {A,{nB}kAT }kBT
(5) T → B : {nB}kBT
An attack on Π is reported in [29]. A list of attacks on Π,Π1,Π2,Π3 and Π f can
be found in [12]. We report from [5] an attack on Π2 (and consequently on Π3 and
Π):
(1.a) A → I(C) : A
(1.b) I(A)→ B : A
(2.b) B → I(A) : nB
(2.a) I(C)→ A : nB
(3.a) A → I(C) : {A,nB}kAT
(3.b) I(A)→ B : {A,nB}kAT
(4.b) B → T : {A,{A,nB}kAT }kBT
(5.b) T → B : {A,nB}kBT
The attack presupposes an authentication request from A to C (1.a), an arbitrary
principal different from B. The enemy begins another authentication session with B,
(1.b), by impersonating A. B sends to A the nonce nB, (2.b), actually intercepted by
the attacker and replicated back to A, (2.a). A encrypts in the ciphertext, (3.a), the
nonce received with her own identity (here is the problem: A wants to authenticate
herself with B, but in the ciphertext there is no information regarding B) and sends
the ciphertext to C. The ciphertext is captured by the attacker and routed to B, (3.b).
B sends the ciphertext to T , (4.b), and the server completes the protocol with the
last message exchange, (5.b). B accepts the authentication request from A but A
wanted to authenticate herself with C. The tagged version of the protocol follows:
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(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {A : Id,nB : Claim}kAT
(4) B → T : {A : Id,{A : Id,nB : Claim}kAT }kBT
(5) T → B : {A : Id,nB : Claim}kBT
Table 9 Simplified Woo and Lam Protocol in ρ-spi calculus
ProtocolW L 
let ki = keymi=1(Ii,I0).
(|m
i, j = 1
i = j
Ii!InitiatorW L(ki,Ii ,Ij)|
Ii!ResponderW L(ki,Ij ,Ii)|
I0!ServerW L(ki,Ii,k j ,Ij))
InitiatorW L(ki,Ii,Ij)
out(Ii). OUTPUT
in(xB). INPUT
run(Ii,Ij). RUN
encrypt{Ij : Id,xB : Verif}ki as x. Verifier
out(x) OUTPUT
ServerW L(ki,Ii,k j ,Ij)
in(Ii,z). INPUT
decrypt z as {Ij : Id,xi : Verif}ki . DECRYPTION
encrypt{Ii : Id,xi : Claim}k j as y. Ttp Forward
out(y) OUTPUT
ResponderW L(Kj ,Ij ,Ii)
new(nB) NEW
out(nB). OUTPUT
in(x). INPUT
out(Ij ,x). OUTPUT
in(y). INPUT
decrypt y as {Ii : Id,nB : Claim}k j DECRYPTION
commit(Ij ,Ii) Auth Claim
We cannot check this protocol since A specifies her own identity in the ciphertext
encrypted with the long term key owned by A and T (Message 3). No rule allows
this kind of encryption, since the verifier identity is missing and the ciphertext is
useless for completing a safe authentication session. Moreover the server encrypts
a ciphertext, with the long term key owned by B and T , where a nonce tagged by
Claim and A by Id appear. There is no rule for this kind of encryption, since the
server has no evidence about the willingness of A to authenticate with B.
The attacks on Π f and Π1 are based on type flaws and can be prevented by
tagging. Indeed, we are able to check in ρ-spi calculus only Π f and Π1. The
tagged version of Π1 is the following:
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {A,B : Id,nB : Verif}kAT
(4) B → T : {A,B,{A,B : Id,nB : Verif}kAT }kBT
(5) T → B : {A : Id,B,nB : Claim}kBT
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For checking the protocol, the identity label B in (3) is required together with the
nonce tagged by Verif. This confirms that the attack to Π2 arises because A does
not specify the intended verifier in the ciphertext (3) and the server has no way to
derive which principal the authentication session is directed to.
Our rules suggest a simplification of the protocol: since the identity label A in
(3) is not tagged, it can be safely removed as well as the outside ciphertext in (4).
The resulting protocol is :
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {B : Id,nB : Verif}kAT
(4) B → T : A,{B : Id,nB : Verif}kAT
(5) T → B : {A : Id,nB : Claim}kBT
This simplification is also suggested in [16]. The ρ-spi calculus specification of
the protocol is given in Table 9. In order to check the correctness of the server,
Ttp Forward is applied. Such a rule states that T may generate a message {A :
Id,x : Claim, . . .}kBT if it has previously decrypted (without checking the nonce) a
message of the form {B : Id,x : Verif, . . .}kAT (kAT and kBT are shared with A and B
respectively); notice that x is forwarded to B so that B can check the freshness of
the first message.
4.4 The Amended Needham Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol
The original version of this protocol was proposed in [28] and was affected by
different attacks. Some of them rely on cryptographic assumptions [8], other on the
protocol’s logics [13]. A correct version of the protocol is the Amended Needham-
Schroeder Protocol, suggested by Needham and Schroeder in [25]:
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : {A,n0B}kBT
(3) A → T : A,B,nA,{A,n0B}kBT
(4) T → A : {nA,B,kAB,{kAB,n0B,A}kBT }kAT
(5) A → B : {kAB,n0B,A}kBT
(6) B → A : {nB}kAB
(7) A → B : {nB−1}kAB
The tagged version of the protocol may help understanding how our system works
with authentication through session keys, and clarifying the protocol’s logics:
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(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : {A,n0B}kBT
(3) A → T : A,B,nA,{A,n0B}kBT
(4) T → A : {nA : Owner,B : Id,kAB : Key,{kAB : Key,n0B : Owner,A : Id}kBT }kAT
(5) A → B : {kAB : Key,n0B : Owner,A : Id}kBT
(6) B → A : {nB}kAB
(7) A → B : {nB−1}kAB
A starts the protocol sending her own identity label to B as cleartext, (1). In (2), B
encrypts, with the long term key shared with T , a fresh nonce n0B together with
the identity label A. By this ciphertext, B communicates to T he is willing to
authenticate himself with A. In (3), A sends to T the ciphertext received by B and,
as cleartext, also a fresh nonce nA and the two identity labels A and B. The server
distributes, by means of two ciphertexts, a session key kAB to A and B, (4). The
identity label B is inserted in the ciphertext encrypted by kAT for communicating to
A that B is the owner of the session key kAB. Similarly the identity label A, in the
ciphertext encrypted by kBT , informs B that A is the owner of kAB. Thus nA and nB
are tagged by Owner and kAB by Key. In (6), A receives a ciphertext encrypted with
kAB. By the nonce-check performed on the ciphertext received in (4), A knows that
kAB is fresh. Since A has not generated any ciphertext encrypted with kAB before,
that ciphertext has been originated by B. Thus B is alive and A can authenticate
him. Similarly, in (7), B receives a ciphertext encrypted with kAB, different from
the one encrypted in (6). Thus that ciphertext has been originated by A and B is
allowed to authenticate her. Let us suppose to provide ρ-spi calculus with integer
numbers as spi calculus [4], and specifically to add prev(d) and succ(d) to data.
The specification of the protocol is in Table 10. The protocol passes our analysis
and, hence, is safe. We briefly discuss the interesting rules of every sequential
component:
(Ttp Distribute) is used for checking the safety of the server. The rule allows
a TTP T to declare new session keys through messages of the form {I : Id,x :
Owner,ks : Key . . .}k. (Ttp Distribute) is trivially satisfied since it has no side
conditions.
(Owner) is used for checking the safety of both the initiator and the responder. The
rule allows A to send a message {D1, . . . ,Dm}y for confirming to have received
the fresh session key y, provided that she has previously decrypted a message
{B : Id,n : Owner,y : Key . . .}kAT , declaring that y is a fresh key shared with B,
and she has previously performed a run with B. Both the conditions are satisfied
in InitiatorNS(ki, Ii, I j) and ResponderNS(k j, I j, Ii).
(Authenticate Owner) states that A may commit B if she has decrypted (i) a mes-
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Table 10 Amended Needham Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol in ρ-spi calculus
ProtocolNS 
let ki = keymi=1(Ii,I0).
(|m
i, j = 1
i = j
Ii!InitiatorNS (ki,Ii,Ij)|
Ii!ResponderNS(ki,Ij ,Ii)|
I0!ServerNS(ki,Ii ,k j ,Ij))
ServerNS(ki,Ii,k j ,Ij).
in(Ii,Ij ,xi,x). INPUT
decrypt x as {Ii,x j}k j . DECRYPTION
new(ki j). NEW
encrypt {x j : Owner,Ii : Id,ki j : Key}k j as y j . Ttp Distribute
encrypt {xi : Owner,Ij : Id,ki j : Key,y j}ki as y. Ttp Distribute
out(y). OUTPUT
InitiatorNS(ki,Ii ,Ij)
out(Ii). OUTPUT
in(x). INPUT
new(nA). NEW
out(Ii,Ij ,nA,x). OUTPUT
in(xT ). INPUT
decrypt xT as {na : Owner,
Ij : Id,xi j : Key,xB}ki . DECRYPTION
out(xB). OUTPUT
in(yB). INPUT
decrypt yB as {y}xi j DECRYPTION
commit(Ii,Ij). Auth Owner
run(Ii,Ij). RUN
encrypt {prec(y)}xi j as x. Owner
out(x) OUTPUT
ResponderNS(k j ,Ij ,Ii)
in(Ii). INPUT
new(nB). NEW
encrypt {Ij ,nB}k j as x. ENCRYPTION
out(x). OUTPUT
in(xT ). INPUT
decrypt xT as {nB : Owner;Ii : Id,xi j : Key}k j . DECRYPTION
new(a). NEW
encrypt {a}xi j as y. Owner
out(y). OUTPUT
in(yA). INPUT
decrypt yA as {prec(a)}xi j . DECRYPTION
commit(Ij ,Ii) Auth Owner
sage {B : Id,n : Owner,y : Key . . .}kAT , encrypted by a TTP, including a fresh ses-
sion key y owned by B and a nonce n that A previously generated; and (ii) at least
one message {D1, . . . ,Dm}y that she did not generate 6 . (Authenticate Owner)
is satisfied in InitiatorNS(ki, Ii, I j) as well as in ResponderNS(k j, I j, Ii).
Notice that also key safety is satisfied, since long term keys and received session
keys are never extruded, and the TTP distributes correctly the session key ki j to Ii
and I j. An interesting point is that the identity label and the nonce in the ciphertext
(2) sent by B are not tagged. This means that such an encryption is useless for the
safety of ProtocolNS. Moreover, the nested encryption (4) produced by the server is
useless too: the ciphertexts could be safely split up. The resulting protocol is known
as Carlsen’s Secret Key Initiator Protocol [11] which, similarly to the Amended
Needham Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol, passes our analysis.
6 in this case the principal sends an encrypted nonce {nA}K and expects to receive back the en-
crypted nonce decremented by one, i.e., {nA−1}K.
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5 An example of multi-protocol system
In this section we present an example of multi-protocol system. Particularly, we
consider the interaction among principals running both the Wide Mouthed Frog
Protocol (Section 4.2) and a slight variant of the Woo and Lam Authentication
Protocol (Section 4.3):
(1) A → B : A
(2) B → A : nB
(3) A → B : {B,M,nB}kAT
(4) B → T : A,{B,M,nB}kAT
(5) T → B : {A,M,nB}kBT
This protocol differs from the simplified version of Section 4.3 only because of the
presence of a payload M sent by A and transmitted by T to B.
5.1 An untagged interleaving
Let us consider what may happen when principals run untagged versions of the
protocols: the multi-protocol system is flawed. In Section 4.2 an attack on the
untagged Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol has been presented: a similar attack can
be performed also in a multi-protocol system. In this case A acts both as initiator,
following the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol, and Responder, following the Woo and
Lam Authentication Protocol:
(1.WMF) A → E(T ) : A
(1.WL) E(B)→ A : B
(2.WL) A → E(B) : nB
(2.WMF) E(T )→ A : nB
(3.WMF) A → E(T ) : {B,M,nB}kAT
(3.WL) E(B)→ A : M′
(4.WL) A → E(T ) : A,M′
(5.WL) E(T )→ A : {B,M,nB}kAT
At the end, A believes that B is willing to authenticate himself: A accepts the au-
thentication request from B even if B is not present in the authentication session.
5.2 A tagged interleaving
Let us now consider the tagged versions of the protocols. The previous attack is
impossible, since B is tagged by Verif in (3.WMF) while is tagged by Claim in
(5.WL). As a direct consequence of Theorem 3.3, given the safety of ProtocolWL
and ProtocolWMF , the parallel composition (Table 11) of principals running the two
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Table 11 An example of multi-protocol system
MultiProtocol 
let ki = keymi=1(Ii,I0).
(|m
i, j = 1
i = j
Ii!InitiatorW MF (ki,Ii,Ij)|Ii!InitiatorW L(ki,Ii,Ij)|
Ii!ResponderW MF (ki,Ij ,Ii)|Ii!ResponderW L(ki,Ij ,Ii)|
I0!ServerW MF (ki,Ii ,k j ,Ij)|I0!ServerW L(ki,Ii ,k j ,Ij))
protocols is safe. An interesting point is the possible interleaving of authentication
sessions. For instance let us consider the following scenario:
(1.WMF) A → B(T ) : A
(2.WL) B(T )→ A : nB
(3.WMF) A → B(T ) : {B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT
(4.WL) B → T : A,{B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT
(5.WL) T → B : {A : Id,M,nB : Claim}kBT
A is running as initiator in the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol, while B as responder
in the Woo and Lam. B intercepts the message sent by A to T and exploits it for
completing the authentication session. The interleaving arises since the second
message of the two protocols has the same structure: an identity label, a payload
and a nonce. Also the tags are the same. The corresponding trace is
A out(A) ::
B in(A) :: B new(nB) :: B out(nB) ::
A in(nB) :: run(A,B) :: A encrypt{B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT :: A out({B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT ) ::
B in({B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT ) :: B out(A,{B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT ) ::
T  in(A,{B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT ) :: T  decrypt{B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT ::
T  encrypt{A : Id,M,nB : Claim}kBT :: T  out({A : Id,M,nB : Claim}kBT ) ::
B in({A : Id,M,nB : Claim}kBT ) :: B decrypt{A : Id,M,nB : Claim}kBT :: commit(B,A)
which is safe. Our tagging is fair general and can be applied uniformly over
authentication protocols. The main result ensures that if every sequential com-
ponent is locally correct, then all their possible interleavings in a multi-protocol
tagged systems are safe. This result is justified by our tagging approach: it con-
veys and formalizes authentication informations and if two messages can be con-
fused, then they provide the same authentication information (in the example case,
{B : Id,M,nB : Verif}kAT conveys the following information: A has started an au-
thentication session with B).
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6 Conclusion
Table 12 Summary of the proof rules
(Authenticate Claim) After receiving {B : Id,n : Claim . . .}k and checking the
nonce n, A authenticates B as the claimant of the authentication session. See
Sections 4.1,4.2 and 4.3.
(Authenticate Owner) After receiving {B : Id,n : Owner,y : Key . . .}kAT and
checking the nonce n, A authenticates y as a fresh session key owned by B. The
reception of {D1, . . . ,Dm}y authenticates B. See section 4.4.
(Authenticate Verif) After receiving {A : Id,n : Verif . . .}kAB and checking the
nonce n, A authenticates B, since the verifier requested by B is A. See Section
4.1.
(Claimant) By encrypting {A : Id,x : Claim, . . .}kAB , A specifies herself as claimant
and starts an authentication session with B. See Section 4.1.
(Verifier) By encrypting {B : Id,x : Verif, . . .}k, A specifies B as verifier and starts
an authentication session with B. See Sections 4.1,4.2 and 4.3.
(Owner) By encrypting {D1, . . . ,Dm}y, A confirms to have received the fresh ses-
sion key y in {B : Id,n : Owner,y : Key, . . .}k and starts an authentication session
with B. See Section 4.4.
(Ttp Forward & Check) By encrypting {A : Id,x :Claim, . . .}kBT , T informs B that
A is recently willing to authenticate herself with him. See Section 4.2
(Ttp Forward) By encrypting {A : Id,x : Claim, . . .}kBT , T informs B that A is will-
ing to authenticate herself with him. Checking the freshness of the request is
demanded to B. See Section 4.3.
(Ttp Distribute) By encrypting {A : Id,x : Owner,ks : Key, . . .}kBT , T distributes
the fresh session key ks to B, declaring that it is shared with A. See Section 4.4.
In this paper we have applied our framework of [9,10] to the analysis of various
authentication protocols taken from literature. The rules applied for verifying each
protocol are summarized in Table 12. Our technique seems to be promising espe-
cially for the simplicity of the analysis. On the other hand, it is fair to observe that
the analysis cannot validate every possible (correct) authentication protocol, since
it could be the case that entity authentication is achieved without necessarily com-
bining together the principles we have considered here. However, the present prin-
ciples appear general enough to validate many existing protocols and help under-
standing the underlying authentication mechanisms. Furthermore, the framework
is scalable as new conditions may be added, if needed, to validate new protocols.
We are currently extending our approach to deal with a wider range of authenti-
R. Focardi, M. Maffei / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 99 (2004) 267–293 291
cation protocols, e.g., protocols based on public-key encryption and other kinds of
nonce-challenges [18,19]. We are basing such an extension on a type and effect
system. This should allow us to formally compare our approach with the type and
effect systems proposed by Gordon and Jeffrey in [16,17].
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ments and suggestions.
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